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Challenging Highways: Widening
the Access to Judicial Review
The federal interest in highways stems from provisions in the Constitution
for establishing post roads,' regulating commerce among the states,2 provid-
ing for the national defenses and promoting the general welfare. 4 Despite
this interest, Congress failed to alleviate the states' highway construction
burden for more than a century.5 Now that Congress has entered the field,
few highways are constructed without federal aid and control.6
Under the Federal-Aid Highway Acts, codified in Title 23, 7 the states
take the initiative in selecting federal-aid highway route locations. They
choose the route locations and plan the individual projects. 8 However, the
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Id., cl. 4.
3. Id., cl. 1.
4. Id.
5. In 1806, Congress authorized construction of the National Road, which by 1838
required approximately $7,000,000 in appropriations. Half a century later, after the
invention of the rubber-tired bicycle and considerable lobbying effort by the League
of American Wheelmen, Congress established the Office of Road Inquiry and appro-
priated $10,000 for research in road management and construction. In 1912, the
Post Office Appropriations Act allotted $500,000 for highway construction. For a
discussion of these early federal efforts, see Miller, History of the Modern Highway in
the United States, in HIGHWAYS IN OuR NATIONAL LIFE (J. Labatut & W. Lane ed. 1950).
Finally, Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 355, which
initiated the present federal-state roadbuilding partnership.
6. Federal-aid highways are divided into three categories or systems: primary,
secondary, and interstate systems. 23 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1964). The primary system
is made up of "important city-to-city, interstate and intrastate highways, serving essen-
tially through traffic." 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(d)(2) (1970). The secondary system gen-
erally consists of rural roads which may include "farm-to-market roads, rural mail
routes, public school bus routes, local rural roads, county roads, township roads, and
roads of the country road class." 23 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1964).
The more recent interstate system will consist of about 42,500 miles of four-lane
superhighways connecting "the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial
centers" of the nation. id. § 103(d) (Supp. V, 1970). The federal government limits
its share of the cost of constructing the primary and secondary systems to approxi-
mately 50 percent. Id. § 120(a). However, in the interstate system, the federal con-
tribution amounts to about 90 percent of the total cost. Id. § 120(c).
7. Id. §§ 101-41, 301-20 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970), and §§ 501-11
(Supp. V, 1970).
8. Id. § 105(a) (1964). The federal government does not advance money to the
states for roadbuilding. The states make the initial expenditure and then claim re-
imbursement for the appropriate federal share of the cost of the project as the work
progresses. The state highway departments are able to plan their programs in
anticipation of federal reimbursement since federal aid for any fiscal year is appor-
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Secretary of Transportation must approve all of the project locations be-
fore federal funds are committed.9 Because the Secretary's decision is not
subject to administrative review, the courts provide the sole avenue of ap-
peal to those citizens challenging his determinations. This article will ex-
amine the reviewability of the federal-aid highway route location procedures
in the federal courts.
Judicial Review
According to Section 701(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),10
judicial review of federal agency decisions is available unless "(1) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law."" Section 704 of the APA states: "Agency action made
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.""12
Although the federal-aid highway legislation has no provision relating
to judicial review, a wide degree of discretion has been granted to the Secre-
tary of Transportation. Congress has placed only one mandatory restriction
on the Secretary's approval, i.e., that he may not approve state plans and
specifications which fail to provide for "safety, durability, and economy of
maintenance.' 3  There are other requirements for federal approval, but
they are either directed to state officials or are left to the discretion of the
Secretary. For example, when a highway project must traverse an urban
area, public hearings on its economic, social, and environmental impact on
the community must be held by the state authorities.' 4  The Secretary
tioned to the states long before the year begins. Id. § 104(e).
Specific amounts of federal highway aid are authorized for each fiscal year by act ofCongress, separately for the interstate system and for the other federal-aid systems.
Id. § 104(b)(5) (Supp. V, 1970) (interstate system); id. §§ 104(b)(l)-(3) (1964)(other systems). These total funds are then divided among the states in accordance
with formulas prescribed by law. Id. (primary and secondary systems); id. § 104(b) (5)
(Supp. V, 1970) (interstate system). The apportionment, usually made nearly a year
in advance of the fiscal year for which apportioned, is a notification to the state of
the amount available to it and against which it can present claims for federal reim-
bursement. Id. § 104(e) (1964).
Following the apportionment, each state highway department prepares a program, or
list of projects, on which it intends to use its federal aid. Id. § 105(a). When de-
tailed plans, specifications, and cost estimates prepared by the state for a specific
project have been approved, the federal share of the cost is formally committed, and
the state may then proceed with the work of construction. Id. § 106(a).
9. Id. The Secretary has delegated this function to the Federal Highway Ad-
ministrator who in turn may delegate the function to an official of the Bureau of
Public Roads (BPR). 23 C.F.R. § 1.37 (1970).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. V, 1970).
11. Id. § 701(a).
12. Id. § 704.
13. 23 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1964).
14. Id. § 128(a)'(Supp. V, 1970).
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merely receives certification 15 and transcripts of the hearings before extending
federal approval. 16 An example of the discretion left to the Secretary is his
latitude of action under legislation which controls outdoor advertising and
junkyards along the interstate system. '[W]henever he determines it to
be in the public interest, the Secretary may suspend, for such periods as
he deems necessary, the application of these subsections to a State."'17 Sus-
pension would then enable a state to construct a highway along an otherwise
federally unacceptable route. Another example is furnished by the recent
highway relocation legislation which states:
The Secretary shall not approve any project . . . which will
cause the displacement of any person, business, or farm operation
unless he receives satisfactory assurances . . . that . . . those dis-
placed receive reasonable relocation and other payments . . . and
within a reasonable period of time . . . there will be available, to
the extent that can reasonably be accomplished, in areas not gen-
erally less desirable . . . decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, as
defined by the Secretary . . . reasonably accessible to their em-
ployment.' 8
Finally, although initially prohibiting the Secretary from approving highway
projects running through public parks, recreation areas, wildlife refuges, and
historic sites of state or local significance, Congress amended the legislation
to permit discretionary approval. 19
Although one might argue that the wide degree of discretion given the
Secretary of Transportation under the federal-aid highway legislation prevents
review under Section 701(a)(2) of the APA,20 Title 23 is silent on this
point. Moreover Title 23 does not explicitly preclude judicial review for
purposes of Section 701(a)(1) of the APA.
Statutory silence has been interpreted as an indication that no review was
intended, but the presumption is generally in favor of review. 21 Com-
menting on this situation as it relates to the APA, Congress has stated:
The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they relate
to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To pre-
clude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in
withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convinc-
15. Id.
16. Id. § 128(b) (1964).
17. Id. § 131(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
18. Id. § 502 (emphasis added).
19. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 § 15(a), 80 Stat. 771, as amended, 23
U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1970).
20. See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Com-
mitted to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
21. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). See also L.
JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 336-63 (1965).
1970]
Catholic University Law Review
ing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to pro-
vide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence
of intent to withhold review.
22
The Supreme Court recently considered this problem in Barlow v. Col-
lins.2 3 Finding that tenant farmers have the right under the APA to ques-
tion regulations formulated by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Court de-
clared that "judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and
nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated. '24 In a com-
panion case decided the same day, Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp,25 the Court stated: "There is no presumption against
judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism . . . unless that
purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."' 26 In both of these
cases the Supreme Court cited Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,27 for the
proposition that "judicial review of final agency action by an aggrieved person
will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was
the purpose of Congress." '28
Although the Supreme Court has never reviewed federal-aid highway route
location decisions, several lower federal courts have reviewed agency de-
cisions regarding causeway construction, hearing procedures, and highway
route location. In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,29
the Secretary of the Army had permitted state authorities to advertise for
causeway construction bids without the approval of the Department of Trans-
portation. Considering this action, the Second Circuit stated:
The statute pursuant to which the Army Chief of Engineers issued
the disputed permit contains no provision for judicial review, nor
does it include specific procedures for appeal of the Army's deci-
sion ...
* * * Since the Army's issuance of this permit was final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, and
review is not clearly and convincingly precluded by the Rivers and
Harbors Act, the Administrative Procedure Act must be read to
confer equitable jurisdiction on the district court . . . if the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act could not itself serve as a basis for
jurisdiction, the important goal of subjecting final agency action to
judicial scrutiny would be frustrated.3 0
22. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
23. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
24. Id. at 166.
25. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
26. Id. at 157.
27. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
28. Id. at 140.
29. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
30. Id. at 101-02.
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Other federal courts have reviewed similar agency action without discuss-
ing the jurisdictional issue. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the administrative
discretion of Tennessee officials in Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v.
Ellington.3 1 The plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the defendants from con-
structing a section of Interstate Route 40 along its planned route in the
northern section of Nashville. When the district court denied their prelimi-
nary injunction, plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the route selection
was arbitrary and that it discriminated against the Negro and low socio-
economic elements of the city's population. The court did not discuss the
APA since the defendants were state officials. The defendants did not even
argue the reviewability issue. The case turned on the question of injunctive
relief-an issue which the court ultimately resolved in favor of the de-
fendants. In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Airis,32 the
District of Columbia Circuit examined the District government's planning
procedures for several highway projects.3 3  Once again, the question of in-
junctive relief claimed the attention of the litigants and the issue of ad-
ministrative discretion was not raised. In D.C. Federation of Civic Asso-
ciations, Inc. v. Volpe34 the same plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgement
and injunction against the Secretary of Transportation and the District gov-
ernment. On appeal from an adverse decision in the district court the
Federation alleged that the Three Sisters Bridge was being built in violation
of Title 23 which requires hearings on such projects.3 5 Without discussing
the issue of administrative discretion or the APA, the court reversed the
district court on the grounds that Title 23 could not constitutionally permit
the construction of the bridge without prior public hearings.3 6
The issue of judicial review was squarely faced in Road Review League v.
Boyd,3 7 where a New York district court reviewed a Federal High-
31. 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
32. 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
33. In this case suit was brought to restrain the Director of the Department of
Highways and Traffic of the District of Columbia, the District Commissioners, the
members of the National Capitol Planning Commission, the FHWA, and various other
federal and District officials and agencies, from constructing four highway projects-
the North Central Freeway, the East Leg, the Three Sisters Bridge, and the Missouri
Avenue Expressway.
34. Civ. No. 23,870 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 6, 1970).
35. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (Supp. V, 1970).
36. The Secretary of Transportation and the District of Columbia argued that
Congress intended to bypass the hearings procedures required by Title 23. Neverthe-
less, the court ruled that public hearings must be held to consider the environmental
impact of the bridge project. The court held that denial of such hearings would
amount to an invidious discrimination against District residents in that they would be
unable to participate in planning the future of their community to the extent that
other United States citizens enjoy that right. Civ. No. 23,870 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 6, 1970).
37. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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way Administration (FHWA) route location decision made by the Bureau
of Public Roads (BPR).
In that case, the New York Superintendant of Public Works had selected
the Chestnut Ridge alignment when opposition surfaced at the initial pub-
lic hearing. With the approval of the BPR, the Superintendent held a second
hearing at which an alternate westerly route was considered. After the sec-
ond hearing, the Superintendent requested that the BPR approve the westerly
route. The BPR denied the request. The Superintendent then resubmitted
the unpopular Chestnut Ridge alignment which the BPR approved. Despite
BPR approval, further studies of the westerly route were submitted to the
FHWA Administrator who with the concurrence of both the Secretary of
Transportation and the Secretary of Commerce made the final determination.
He chose the Chestnut Ridge alignment.
The plaintiffs, a local community, and several civic associations, were
seeking a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment that the selec-
tion of the Chestnut Ridge alignment of Interstate Route 87 was arbitrary
and capricious. The Agency moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that
its discretion was absolute and not subject to judicial review.38 However,
the district court saw "nothing in the Highways Act which indicates a con-
gressional intent to immunize the Bureau of Public Roads from judicial
scrutiny of its acts."3 9 The court noted that the Transportation Act specifi-
cally makes the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to its proceed-
ings, 40 and declared: "To hold that these decisions cannot be reviewed, no
matter how arbitrary they may be, would be unsound and unjust."' 41
Standing
Granted that administrative route location decisions are subject to judicial re-
view, the question remains: who can bring such determinations to the at-
tention of the courts-i.e., who has the requisite standing? Early state court
decisions laid down the answer with such uniformity as to make it axio-
matic: an individual or group whose property did not lie directly in the path
of or immediately adjacent to a new highway was not entitled to bring suit
to secure judicial review of the governmental authority responsible for de-
termining the location of the highway.42
38. Id. at 652. To contrast this position with that taken by the FHWA in pro-
posing review procedures, see discussion of Proposed FHWA Reg. § 3.17, 33 Fed.
Reg. 15666 (1968).
39. 270 F. Supp. at 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(h) (Supp. V, 1970).
41. 270 F. Supp. at 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
42. See, e.g., Brown v. Smith, 147 Ga. 483, 94 S.E. 567 (1917); Brown v. Paul,
100 Kan. 319, 164 P. 288 (1917); Lord v. County Comm'rs, 105 Me. 556, 75 A. 126
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In Overbeck v. Galloway43 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
taxpaying citizen of the affected community whose own property was not
jeopardized by the new road did not have standing to attack the county
court order establishing the road. Permitting the citizen to bring suit, the
court reasoned "would not only be ruinous, but violative of those general
principles, that a common interest which belongs equally to all, and in which
the parties suing have no special or peculiar property, will not maintain a
suit." 44
In Conklin v. County Commissioners,45 a town resident asked the Minne-
sota Supreme Court to review the Fillmore County Commissioners' decision
to change the location of a highway. In quashing the writ of certiorari, the
court stated the prevailing rule of the 1880's:
[T]he plaintiff has not a right to prosecute this action. He does not
show nor pretend that he is damnified more or otherwise than any
other resident of the town near or over whose land the road is laid,
or who ordinarily travels on the road. The change complained of is
not on or near his land. The injury. . . if any. . . is to the com-
munity, not to him in his individual capacity, and it is for them, not
for him, to redress it . . . [for] if one member of the community
in his individual capacity has a remedy for such an injury, so has
every other member. To permit this would be intolerable, and
contrary to all precedent or reason.46
Just after the turn of the century, a group of community citizens and tax-
payers petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine for a writ of certiorari
to set aside the highway location determinations of county officers in Lord
v. County Commissioners.47 The court held that the petitioners did not have
sufficient interest to maintain the writ.
The only ground for their claim of right to petition for this writ is
that they 'are citizens and taxpayers of said town of Naples.' If,
for this reason, they have the right to petition for certiorari to quash
the laying out of this townway, then for a like reason has each
citizen and taxpayer of the town alike right. But to permit that
would be both unreasonable and contrary to precedent."'48
(1909); Vanderstalph v. Highway Comm'r, 50 Mich. 330, 15 N.W. 495 (1883); Blakely
v. Board of Superintendents, 171 Miss. 652, 158 So. 483 (1935); Overbeck v. Galloway,
10 Mo. 364 (1847); Bennett v. Tuftonborough, 72 N.H. 63, 54 A. 700 (1903); Allen v.
Parker County, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 536, 57 S.W. 703 (1900). See also 39 AM. Jun.
2d Highways, Streets and Bridges § 38 (1968); 39 C.J.S. Highways § 54 (1963).
43. 10 Mo. 364 (1847).
44. Id. at 365.
45. 13 Minn. 423 (1882).
46. Id. at 423-24.
47. 105 Me. 556, 75 A. 126 (1909).
48. Id. at 559, 75 A. at 128.
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Standing presents a more complicated problem for federal courts. 49 Gen-
erally, the question of standing in the federal courts must be considered within
the framework of Article III which restricts judicial attention to cases and
controversies.5" In Flast v. Cohen5 1 the Supreme Court stated:
[I]n terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction,
the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary con-
text and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolu-
tion. 52
When the plaintiff asserts under the APA that he is "aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute" 53 the federal courts must ask
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
in question." '5 4
Departmental Regulations
The federal highway legislation protects a considerable zone of interest.
For example, the Secretary of Transportation must approve all federal-aid
highway route locations"5 and in so doing he must consider the social,
economic, and environmental impact of the proposed highway on each com-
munity affected.5 6 Local needs are to be given as much consideration as
the needs of interstate commerce. 57 To implement this legislation, the Sec-
retary has published regulations requiring state highway departments to
consider natural resources, land use patterns, and social values of the com-
munities affected by the selected route. 8 Moreover, the regulations author-
ize the Administrator of the FHWA to "promulgate and require the ob-
servance of such policies and procedures . . . as he may deem necessary
for carrying out the . . .Federal laws and the regulations in this part."'59
49. See generally K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 208-94 (1958); L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-545 (1965). For an ex-
cellent discussion of the problem see Judge Tamm's opinion in Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
51. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
52. Id. at 101.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970).
54. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970).
55. 23 U.S.C. § 103(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
56. Id. § 109(a) (1964), § 134 (Supp. V, 1970).
57. id. § 101(b).
58. 23 C.F.R. § 1.6(c) (1970). See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
59. 23 C.F.R. § 1.32 (1970).
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If states fail to comply with such regulations, the Administrator may with-
hold funds for the projects involved, refuse approval of future projects, or
take "such other action as he may deem appropriate under the circum-
stances." 60
Pursuant to the above regulations, 61 the Administrator has issued two im-
portant memoranda-one concerning highway location approval 62 and one
dealing with urban transportation planning.63  The highway location mem-
orandum requires that state highway departments afford an opportunity for
two hearings before approval will be given for any primary or interstate
system project. 64  States must afford the opportunity for a "corridor public
hearing' 65- before approval of route location, and a "highway design public
hearing" 66 before approval of a design proposal. Ideally, the corridor
hearing affords interested persons the opportunity to (1) participate in de-
termining the community's highway needs67 and (2) present their views on
the probable impact of the alternate route locations upon their community.
68
The design hearing offers concerned citizens the chance to participate in
choosing the specific location and major design features of the highway,
"including social, economic, environmental and other effects. ' ' 69 According
to the FHWA memorandum, "'social, economic, and environmental ef-
fects' means the direct and indirect benefits or losses to the community and
to highway users."' 70
60. Id. § 1.36.
61. Id. § 1.32.
62. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8, Jan. 14, 1969, 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1,
app. A (1970) [hereinafter cited as PPM 20-81.
63. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-9, June 21, 1967, as amended, Nov. 24,
1969 [hereinafter cited as PPM 50-9].
64. PPM 20-8 6a. Hearings are not required for projects involving mere im-
provements to existing facilities. Id. 6c.
65. Id. 4a.
66. Id. 4b.
67. Id. 4a(2).
68. Id. 4a(3).
69. Id. 4b(3).
70. Id. 4c. Included among such social, economic, and environmental effects
are:
(1) Fast, safe and efficient transportation. (2) National defense. (3) Eco-
nomic activity. (4) Employment. (5) Recreation and parks. (6) Fire protec-
tion. (7) Aesthetics. (8) Public utilities. (9) Public health and safety. (10)
Residential and neighborhood character and location. (11) Religious institu-
tions and practices. (12) Conduct and financing of Government (including
effect on local tax base and social service costs). (13) Conservation (in-
cluding erosion, sedimentation, wildlife and general ecology of the area).
(14) Natural and historic landmarks. (15) Noise, and air and water pollu-
tion. (16) Property values. (17) Multiple use of space. (18) Replacement
housing. (19) Education (including disruption of school district operations).
(20) Displacement of families and businesses. (21) Engineering, right-of-
way and construction costs of the project and related facilities. (22) Main-
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In the transportation planning memorandum, the FHWA provides state
highway departments with definitions and interpretations of the urban plan-
ning process to be developed and utilized by states in formulating federal-
aid highway programs. 7' This memorandum is applicable to all urban areas
with populations in excess of 50,000.72 In such areas, transportation plan-
ning is to be a continuing, comprehensive, cooperative process. 73 The term,
"continuing," indicates the necessity for maintaining current data to be used
in re-evaluation and analysis of transportation plans.7 4  To be "comprehen-
sive" the planning process must correlate economic, population, and land
use factors, and must include estimations of future transportation needs. 75
"Cooperation is construed to mean that each jurisdiction having authority
and responsibility for actions of regionwide significance should have appro-
priate voice in the planning process."'76 The memorandum sets out and de-
fines ten elements to be included in the planning process. Among these
elements are: economic factors, population, land use, zoning and other
local ordinances, transportation facilities, and social and community values. 77
The FHWA makes its most novel contribution with the inclusion of a final
section declaring that "citizen participation is needed at all stages of the
planning process beginning with the spelling out of goals and objectives and
extending through the choice between alternatives for both land use and trans-
portation. 78
It is clear that the FHWA procedures for double public hearings and
citizen planning participation reflect DOT's concern for public opinion on the
subject of route selection and location. 79 However, the fact that FHWA lo-
cation approval may be issued only after appropriate state highway depart-
ment planning and public hearings does not suffice to protect the rights of
tenance and operating costs of the project and related facilities. (23) Opera-
tion and use of existing highway facilities and other transportation facilities
during construction and after completion.
Id.
71. PPM 50-9 1. The authority for the urban transportation planning require-
ments is the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1964).
72. PPM 50-9 3a(l). The boundaries of the urban areas are those established
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census' list of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or,
in lieu thereof, the municipal boundaries. Id. 3b(1). However, for purposes of
comprehensive planning, these areas should be expanded to include all surrounding
areas likely to be urbanized within the next 20 years. Id. 3b(2).
73. See 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1964); PPM 50-9 4.
74. Id. 4c.
75. Id. 4b.
76. Id. 4d(2).
77. Id. 4a(4), 5a-j.
78. Id. 6a.
79. The issue of route locations is so heated that the Secretary of DOT has on
several occasions denied construction permission. See Karr, Halting Highways, Wall
Street Journal, Apr. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
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the public. There should be a system of procedures for administrative ap-
peal of route location approval. Unfortunately, the FHWA has no such pro-
cedures.80 In light of this absence, it is especially important that FHWA
determinations be reviewable by the courts and that concerned citizens and
civic associations be entitled to maintain such suits.
Citizen Environmental Suits
Although the federal highway legislation contains no explicit provision con-
ferring standing upon a party aggrieved by DOT action, it is clear that the
provision of the APA granting a remedy by way of judicial review to per-
sons "aggrieved by agency action" fills this void.8 ' Moreover, under the
rationale of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC8 2 and Office
of Communication of the Church of Christ v. FCC,83 the aggrieved person
need not assert an economic interest in order to maintain his suit. Indeed,
as the Supreme Court noted in Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations v. Camp,84 standing under the APA may stem from aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational interests. 85 Therefore it follows that in-
dividuals and groups, devoid of any real property interests, who assert that
the public's aesthetic, conservational, or recreational interests are at stake,
should be entitled to bring suit to enjoin the construction of a federal-aid
highway.
Several lower federal court decisions support this conclusion. In Road
Review League v. Boyd 6 the plaintiffs were the town of Bedford, a local
civic association of town residents, two wildlife sanctuaries, certain owners
whose property would be taken for the project, and the Road Review League,
"a non-profit association which concern[ed] itself with community prob-
lems, primarily those affecting the location of highways."8a7 The Road Re-
view lague made no showing that any of its members owned or leased any
property affected by the proposed highway. In holding that all the plain-
80. Appellate procedures were proposed by the FHWA in 1968 but the proposal
was withdrawn for further study. See Proposed FHWA Reg. § 3.17, 33 Fed. Reg.
15666 (1968). Under this proposal any "interested person" might file an appeal of
the route location selection of the FHWA's divisional engineer "within 15 days after
the date of publication of the notice of that action." Id. Absent such appeal, the
divisional engineer's decision "becomes final for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. [§] 704,
30 days after the date of publication of the notice." Id.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970).
82. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
83. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
84. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
85. Id. at 153.
86. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
87. Id. at 652.
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tiffs had standing, the court based its opinion on the APA and Scenic Hud-
son:
The Administrative Procedure Act . . .entitles a person who
is "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute," to obtain judicial review of that action. The "relevant stat-
ute" in this instance is the Federal Highways Act ...
I have concluded that these provisions [of the highway legisla-
tion] are sufficient, under the principle of Scenic Hudson, to mani-
fest a congressional intent that towns, local civic organizations,
and conservation groups are to be considered "aggrieved" by agency
action which allegedly disregarded their interests.88
In Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 9 the Sixth Circuit ruled
on the standing of similar litigants. The appellants were "members of an
unincorporated association of some thirty businessmen, teachers, ministers,
civic and professional leaders, and residents of North Nashville ...
su[ing] on behalf of themselves as individuals, in the name of their associa-
tion, and on behalf of the community they represent." 90  No contention was
made that property owned by the appellants was directly affected by the
route location. In holding that the appellants had standing the court cited
Scenic Hudson and stated: "Appellees urge that appellants have no standing
to maintain this action. We reject this contention." 1
More important is the Second Circuit's discussion of standing in Citizens
Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe.92 Among the plaintiffs were the
Citizens Committee-an unincorporated association of citizens residing near
the proposed expressway-and the Sierra Club. The court noted that neither
group claimed that it would suffer any personal or direct economic injury
if the highway should be constructed. Rather, both associations asserted that
the public's interest in the environmental resources of the area gave them
the right to maintain the suitY3 In examining the nature of this public in-
terest, the court justified the propriety of the Sierra Club's speaking on behalf
of the local citizens by pointing to the fact that although the Sierra Club is a
national organization, it has a "substantial membership in the area of the
Expressway, and a history of involvement in the preservation of national
scenic and recreational resources. '94
The court's treatment of this point is brief but the matter is not trivial.
A group asserting the public interest should be required to show the extent of
88. Id. at 660-61.
89. 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1967).
90. 387 F.2d at 181.
91. Id. at 182.
92. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
93. id. at 102.
94. Id. at 103.
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the public's interest in the group. Any such group should disclose its pur-
poses, goals, and specific interests as well as the extent of its memberships-
both local and national. Judicial scrutiny of such associations will lessen
the possibility that any group of individuals motivated by narrow self-in-
terest might successfully assert that it speaks for the public.
Finding that both groups in the instant case were qualified to speak for the
public, the court declared:
We hold . . . that the public interest in environmental resources
• . .is a legally protected interest affording these plaintiffs, as re-
sponsible representatives of the public, standing to obtain ju-
dicial review of agency action alleged to be in contravention of
that public interest.0 5
These cases secure the right of citizens and qualified civic associations to
assert the public's interest when the nation's natural resources, recreational
facilities, or historical monuments are endangered by the federal highway pro-
gram. No longer need a plaintiff be a landowner to maintain an injunctive
suit. Now a citizen or civic association, without any real property interest
can halt the highway when the community's environmental resources are
threatened.
Conclusion
The purpose of highways is not the carrying of traffic. That is the function
of highways. The purpose of the highways is to serve the community. The
confusion of highway purpose and function may be due to the fact that the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,96 having established the interstate sys-
tem, delivered the program into the hands of engineers. Emphasis was on
speed in roadbuilding--engineering, acquisition of rights-of-way, and con-
struction. As a result, according to the BPR, "during the early years
of the expanded and accelerated program, social considerations were sub-
ordinated to the principal assignment of getting miles of pavement open to
traffic."9 An eminent planner lamenting this situation has stated:
The highway engineers into whose hands this program has been
delivered have assumed a terrible responsibility, far beyond what
many of them realize. They are, by and large, skilled and compe-
tent-perhaps more so in their field than we planners are in ours.
But this program forces them to make decisions that have impacts
far outside their field. It does not belittle them to say that just
as war is too important to leave to the generals, so highways are too
95. Id. at 105.
96. 70 Stat. 374 (1956).
97. BPR, HIGHWAYS & HUMAN VALUES 5 (1966).
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important to leave to the highway engineers. 98
Congress has remedied many of the defects of its earlier legislation. Title
23 now includes sections dealing with: control of outdoor advertising99 and
junkyards; 100 preservation of local parks, recreation areas, and historic
sites; 1 1 relocation assistance; 02 and urban transportation planning. 03 These
sections, as well as the departmental regulations issued to implement them,
lay the foundation for transportation policies which must be responsive to
the needs of local communities. The procedures established by the FHWA
affording interested citizens the opportunity to voice their opinions at two
public hearings and the opportunity to contribute to the planning process are
commendable. However, the absence of any FHWA review provisions con-
trasts sharply with this demonstrated concern for public sentiment. The fact
that agency route location decisions are subject to judicial review completes
the process of public participation and prevents administrative absolutism.
Such review encourages state and federal highway officials to give greater
consideration to the community's opinions expressed in the initial location
and design hearings, to weigh the alternate routes more carefully, and to
minimize the harmful social, economic, and environmental impact of the
federal-aid highway program on the nation's rural and urban areas.
John Barry Kelly, II
98. Howard, Impact of the Federal Highway Program, 1957 PLANNING 35, 39
(annual publication of American Society of Planning Officials).
99. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (Supp. V, 1970).
100. Id. § 136.
101. Id. § 138.
102. Id. §§ 501-11.
103. Id. § 134 (1964).
